We test the hypothesis that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is positive 
Introduction
Foreign aid to harmonious recipient countries in which everybody cooperates to improve standards of living should be effective. Recent contributions scrutinizing the voluminous aid effectiveness literature however find no robust evidence for a positive effect of foreign aid on economic growth (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008 ).
In at least some recipient countries, foreign aid must thus have indirect negative effects on economic growth that offset any positive growth effects. Svensson (2000) presents a model in which aid inflows may have an indirect negative effect because they induce people from rivalling social or ethnic groups to divert time and resources away from productive to rent seeking activities. These rent seeking activities can be any type of socially wasteful activities that help to channel aid inflows and potentially other public funds towards one's own group. Such activities may include bribery and corruption, lobbying and political campaigning, distorted policies as well as intimidation or even violence and civil warfare. Indeed, Svensson finds foreign aid to raise corruption in ethnically fractionalized, but not in ethnically homogenous countries.
1 Hodler (2006) studies a similar model, but assumes that institutional quality is endogenous and decreasing in the share of aggregate resources devoted to rent seeking activities. His model predicts that the direct positive effect of foreign aid dominates the negative effect of higher rent seeking and lower institutional quality if the number of rivalling groups is low, while the negative effect dominates if the number of rivalling groups is high.
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The models of Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2006) predict that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth should be clearly positive in homogenous countries, but smaller or even negative in countries with many rivalling ethnic groups. In this paper, we test this hypothesis using panel data covering 114 aid recipient countries over the period 1962 to 2001 . We are interested in the growth effects of both foreign aid and its interaction with the index of ethnic fractionalization, which serves as our proxy for the number of rivalling groups. Employing two-stage least squares and GMM estimation techniques, we find a positive coefficient on foreign aid and a negative coefficient on the interaction term. These findings, which survive various robustness exercises, support our hypothesis. Our estimates suggest that about one half or even more of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (and a few countries in other continents) are so ethnically fractionalized that foreign aid tends to retard their economic growth.
This paper contributes to the aid effectiveness literature, in particular its newer branch -the conditional aid effectiveness literature 3 -which studies the conditions under which foreign aid is effective (rather than whether or not foreign aid is effective in an average country). Despite some doubts about the robustness of their findings, Burnside and Dollar Lensink and White find diminishing returns to foreign aid, i.e., a negative coefficient on aid squared. Dalgaard and his co-authors find that aid is more effective outside the tropics than within. In particular, they find a positive coefficient on aid, but a negative coefficient on the interaction term between aid and the fraction of a country's area located in the tropics. Angeles and Neanidis hypothesize that aid effectiveness depends on the size of the local elite, which they proxy by the share of colonial settlers. They find a positive coefficient on aid, but a negative coefficient on the interaction term between aid and the share of colonial settlers.
We compare our results to these findings. We find that the interaction term between aid and ethnic fractionalization tends to be more robust than aid squared and the interaction term between aid and the fraction of a country's area located in the tropics. Hence previous studies may have found strong evidence for aid to be less effective in the tropics and when
given in large amounts partly because fractionalized countries tend to be located in the tropics and to receive a lot of aid. We also find evidence that ethnic fractionalization and the share of colonial settlers both lower aid effectiveness. Inspired by Caselli and Coleman (2006) , we argue that this finding may suggest that rent seeking contests for aid inflows do not only get more detrimental as the number of ethnic groups raises, but also as the racial differences between the major ethnic groups grow larger.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the consequences of ethnic fractionalization for economic development. Easterly and Levine (1997) The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses our empirical methodology and the data. Section 3 presents our main results and various robustness exercises. Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology and data
We employ panel data covering 114 aid recipient countries over the period 1962 to 2001.
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We use four year averages of our measures of foreign aid and economic growth. To test whether the aid-growth relationship varies systematically with ethnic fractionalization, we estimate the following model:
where GROW T H it is the average growth rate of real per capita GDP in country i from year t to year t+3, AID it a measure of average yearly aid inflows in this period, ET HNIC i an index of ethnic fractionalization, and X it a vector of other control variables.
We are mainly interested in the effect of a change in AID it on GROW T H it . The point estimate of this effect is β 1 + β 2 ET HNIC i . Our hypothesis suggests that β 1 should be significantly positive, and β 2 significantly negative. It would then follow that GROW T H it is increasing in AID it if ET HNIC i is below the threshold of −β 1 /β 2 , but decreasing in
We use the measures of GROW T H it and AID it from the extensive data set compiled by Roodman (2004) . 7 This data set contains three measures of aid inflows: Effective development assistance (EDA) relative to real GDP, net overseas development assistance (ODA) relative to real GDP, and ODA relative to exchange rate GDP, i.e. GDP converted to US dollars using market exchange rates rather than purchasing power parities. The EDA data corrects for a number of short-comings in the ODA data and should therefore be conceptually superior in measuring the true aid element of grants and loans (Chang et al., 1998) . We follow the recent literature by using EDA-to-real GDP in our baseline specifications, and the ODA variables to check the robustness of our results. We denote EDA-to-real GDP by AID it , ODA-to-real GDP by ODA R it , and ODA-to-exchange rate GDP by ODA X it . We use the index of ethnic fractionalization (ET HNIC i ) by Alesina et al. (2003) to proxy for the number of rivalling ethnic groups. This index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals of a particular country belong to different ethnolinguistic groups. Hence higher scores indicate a more fractionalized country. This index is only available as a cross-section, but we are not concerned by this because the ethnic composition of countries tends to be very slow-moving (Alesina et al., 2003) . We also use the similarly constructed indices of linguistic and religious fractionalization (LANGUAGE i and RELIGION i ). Table 1 provides summary statistics for our three main variables -GROW T H it , AID it and ET HNIC i -based on all observations used in our baseline specifications.
Following the literature, our control variables include "initial" per capita GDP in year t (GDP it ), and a dummy variable for the fast-growing East Asian countries (EASIA i ).
Over the period 1962 to 2001, the average growth rate in these countries was close to 5% compared to 1% in the rest of the sample.
Many studies in the aid effectiveness literature further add control variables that proxy for fiscal, monetary and trade policies, institutional quality, political stability and governance. We refrain from adding such control variables. The models of Svensson (2000) and Hodler (2006) suggest that the rent seeking activities caused by aid inflows in ethnically diverse countries go hand-in-hand with poor (fiscal) policies and lead to a deterioration in institutional quality. The resulting rent seeking contests are also likely to be associated with political instability and bad governance. These models therefore predict that in fractionalized countries, foreign aid has an indirect negative effect on economic growth working via rent seeking, poor policies, bad governance, political instability and weak institutions.
We can only test this hypothesis if we exclude these variables. Otherwise, we would be testing whether ethnic fractionalization impacts upon the aid-growth relationship through some channel unrelated to policies, governance, political stability and institutional quality.
To address the potential omitted variable bias, we add year dummies to account for time varying common shocks and regional dummies to control for regional fixed effects. finding that strategic and cultural ties are important determinants of aid flows. Countries in the Franc zone and Central America receive more aid from France and the United States, respectively, for cultural reasons unrelated to economic performance, while Egypt receives more aid for geopolitical reasons. Donors also tend to give more aid per capita to small countries as well as to countries that have arms deals with them, again for reasons unrelated to economic performance. However we deviate from most of the literature by not using lagged aid as an instrument for current aid. Rajan and Subramanian (2008) note that using such lagged variables as instruments may be problematic. The reason is that the average growth rate in, say, the period from 1998 to 2001 may well depend on aid inflows in, say, 1997, which would violate the instrument exogeneity requirement. To ensure that our set of instruments is sufficiently strong despite dropping lagged aid, we add quadratics of ARMS it and P OP it .
9 Since we need to instrument for AID it as well as its interaction
with ET HNIC i , we also add ARMS it × ET HNIC i and P OP it × ET HNIC i to our set of instruments.
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We address the potential endogeneity of foreign aid also by using the Generalized variables into first differences and uses lagged levels of the endogenous variables to instrument for these differences, which is why it is commonly referred to as the difference-GMM estimator. The Blundell-Bond estimator adds the levels of the endogenous variables to the system to be instrumented and uses the lagged first differences as additional instruments.
This is known as the system-GMM estimator. 11 We apply these GMM estimators using a two-step estimation process, which tends to be more efficient than a one-step process, and 9 Dividing arms imports by GDP rather than total imports serves the same purpose. 10 Further adding ARM S 2 it × ET HN IC i and P OP 2 it × ET HN IC i to our set of instruments would not lead to any noticeable change in our results.
11 These estimators both have their limitations. The difference-GMM estimator often leads to a weak instruments problem, while the system-GMM is only valid if the lagged differences are orthogonal to the fixed effects. Besides addressing the potential endogeneity of aid, these GMM estimators have the added advantage that they "incorporate (implicitly) fixed effects" (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008, p. 644). This possibility to control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity is particularly valuable in our study, in which we cannot control for policy, governance and institutional variables because of the hypothesized channels through which ethnic fractionalization impacts upon aid effectiveness.
When employing these GMM panel estimators, one needs to be careful in the choice of the number of lags of the endogenous variables. We only use endogenous variables that are lagged at least twice as instruments. We first report results when the number of lags of the endogenous variables used as instruments is otherwise unrestricted. However, as pointed out by Roodman (2004, p. 25) , GMM panel estimators may in this case create numerous instruments that "can overfit the instrumented variables." We follow his advice and also report results when using only the second and third lags of the endogenous variables as instruments, and when collapsing the set of instruments. Table 2 presents our main results. In column (1) we estimate our model using OLS. The coefficients on AID it and AID it ×ET HNIC i have the predicted signs, but are statistically insignificant. The coefficients on ET HNIC i and GDP it also have the expected negative signs, but are insignificant as well. Not surprisingly, the dummy variable for the fastgrowing East Asian countries (EASIA i ) is highly significant.
Findings
In column (2) we address the potential endogeneity of AID it and AID it × ET HNIC i 9 using 2SLS with the set of instruments discussed in the previous section. Before looking at the coefficients, let us briefly discuss the two specification tests. The Hansen J-test is often used to assess the validity of the instruments. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and, therefore, exogenous. To get an idea how sizeable the effect of ethnic fractionalization on aid effectiveness is, let us consider the case of Uganda. Uganda is the most ethnically fractionalized country in the world with ET HNIC U GA = 0.930. Over the period 1998 to 2001, it received EDA equal to only 1.2% of its GDP, and its average yearly growth rate was 2.5%. Our point estimates suggest that the contribution of these aid inflows to its growth rate was -0.4%, i.e., that Uganda would have grown at a rate of 2.9% in the absence of foreign aid. However the contribution of these aid inflows to its growth rate would have been 0.6% if Uganda were about as ethnically fractionalized as the average country in our sample (such as Nicaragua or Venezuela), and even 1.7% if Uganda were perfectly ethnically homogenous (such as Comoros).
12 These counterfactuals illustrate that the effect of ethnic fractionalization on aid effectiveness is economically significant.
Given that most ethnically fractionalized countries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, we might suspect that our results are driven by countries from this region. In column (3) we therefore omit Sub-Saharan African countries from our sample. We find that the results remain very similar except that the coefficients on AID it and AID it × ET HNIC i get somewhat larger in magnitude. Hence ethnic fractionalization lowers aid effectiveness also outside Sub-Saharan Africa. In column (4) we account more systematically for the possibility that outliers may drive our results by using the Hadi (1992) procedure to identify and remove outliers. In the absence of outliers the coefficients of interest are of similar magnitude and statistical significance as when the full sample is used.
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We next employ GMM estimation techniques to address the potential endogeneity of foreign aid as well as to account for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. In column (5) we use the system-GMM estimator with all possible lags of the endogenous variables as instruments starting from the second lag. The coefficients of interest again have the predicted signs, and they are highly statistically significant. The Hansen J-test suggests that the exogeneity of the instruments cannot be rejected; and the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) fails to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 14 Even though the number of instruments is not overly high, we follow Roodman's (2004) recommendation and reduce the number of instruments by using only twice and thrice lagged endogenous variables in column (6) , and by collapsing the set of instruments in column (7). In both instances, our Following Roodman's suggestion, we use a 5% significance level to remove outliers to the partial scatter plot of GROW T H it against the predicted values of AID it × ET HN IC i after projection onto the instruments. Our main results also survive if we use other standard tests for outliers based on Cook's Distance, DFITS and the standardized residuals.
14 The appropriate null hypothesis is absence of second-order autocorrelation because first-differencing of endogenous variables directly induces first-order autocorrelation.
results survive. In column (8), we show that the coefficients of interest have the predicted signs and are close to being significant even when using the difference-GMM estimator.
Compared to the 2SLS estimates, the GMM estimates imply somewhat lower threshold levels of ET HNIC i . Hence aid inflows may retard economic growth in considerably more than half of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as in some fractionalized countries in Latin America and elsewhere.
15
In the remainder of this section we present further robustness exercises based on the 2SLS regression of column (2) and the GMM regression of column (6) of table 2. In table 3 we test whether our results are robust when controlling for geographical and institutional variables. In columns (1) and (2) we add the distance from the equator (LAT IT UDE i ) and the fraction of a country's area located in the tropics (T ROP ICS i ) to our baseline 2SLS regression. We note that the coefficients on AID it and the interaction term have the predicted signs and remain statistically significant.
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As argued earlier, we expect ethnic fractionalization to impact upon aid effectiveness via rent seeking, poor policies, bad governance, political instability and weak institutions. To test our hypothesis we therefore generally refrain from controlling for these variables. However institutions are arguably slower-moving and, consequently, less sensitive to changes in aid than policies and governance. In columns (3) to (8) we therefore test whether our results still hold when controlling for institutional quality in our baseline 2SLS and GMM regressions. We use the indices of political rights (P OLIT ICAL it ) and civil liberties (CIV IL it ) from Freedom House, which are inverse measures of institutional quality. We find that the coefficients on AID it and the interaction term still show the predicted signs and remain statistically significant at least at the 10% level.
In table 4 we test whether our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of foreign aid and fractionalization. In columns (1) to (4) we replace AID it by the two ODA-based aid measures ODA R it and ODA X it in our baseline 2SLS and GMM regressions. We note that the coefficients on these aid measures and their interactions with ET HNIC i have the predicted signs and are statistically significant in all four regressions, except that ODA X it × ET HNIC i is marginally insignificant in column (3). These results lend further support to our hypothesis.
In columns (5) to (8) (1) and (2) we add aid squared (AID 2 it ) to our baseline 2SLS and GMM regressions. We note that the coefficients on AID it and AID it ×ET HNIC i retain the predicted signs and their statistical significance, while the coefficient on AID 2 it is significant in column (2), but not in column (1) . These results provide further support for our hypothesis. They moreover suggest that earlier studies may have found robust evidence for the hypothesis of decreasing returns to aid partly because more fractionalized countries (paradoxically) tend to receive more aid (with the correlation between AID it and ET HNIC i being 0.25).
To compare our hypothesis to the finding of Dalgaard et al. (2004), we add the interaction term AID it × T ROP ICS i in columns (3) and (4). Since we need to instrument also for this interaction term, we add ARMS it × T ROP ICS i and P OP it × T ROP ICS i to the set of our instruments. Again, the coefficients on AID it and AID it × ET HNIC i retain the predicted signs and their statistical significance. The interaction term AID it ×T ROP ICS i has the expected sign and is statistically significant in column (4), but not in column (3).
Hence Dalgaard and his co-authors may have found that aid is more effective outside the tropics partly because countries in the tropics tend to be more ethnically fractionalized (with the correlation between T ROP ICS i and ET HNIC i being 0.53).
We finally compare our hypothesis to the findings of Angeles and Neanidis (2009). In columns (5) and (6) we add an interaction term between AID it and the share of colonial settlers (SET T LERS i ) to our baseline 2SLS and GMM regressions. We also add ARMS it × SET T LERS i and P OP it × SET T LERS i to the set of our instruments. We find that the coefficients on AID it , AID it ×ET HNIC i and AID it ×SET T LERS i all have the predicted signs and are statistically significant. These results provide further support for our hypothesis as well as for the hypothesis of Angeles and Neanidis. Hence foreign aid becomes less effective when there are many rivalling groups as well as when there exists a strong elite of colonial settlers. These results are also consistent with the idea that rent seeking contests caused by aid inflows do not only get more detrimental as the number of ethnic groups raises, but also as the racial differences between the major ethnic groups 14 grow larger.
Conclusions
Using panel data covering 114 aid recipient countries over the period 1962 to 2001, we find that foreign aid is effective in promoting economic growth in ethnically homogenous countries and that higher ethnic fractionalization reduces aid effectiveness. Our estimates suggest that foreign aid may have retarded economic growth in many fractionalized countries, most of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that there is a direct positive effect of foreign aid on economic growth, which is offset in fractionalized countries in which aid inflows may provoke detrimental rent seeking contests associated with poor policies, bad governance, political instability and possibly a deterioration in institutional quality.
These findings have implications for future foreign aid policy. They suggest that more focus should be placed on the degree of integration of distinct groups in a country. If a country is starkly fractionalized, fungible aid flows without conditions and close oversight may do more harm than good. A clearer view on practical methods that are effective in counteracting the negative effects of aid in fractionalized countries would certainly benefit from further research on a more microeconomic level. GAB 1974 GAB -1977 GNB 1974 GNB -1977 GNB , 1982 GNB -1985 GNB , 1986 GNB -1989 IRQ 1990 IRQ -1993 JOR 1974 JOR -1977 JOR , 1978 JOR -1981 JOR , 1982 JOR -1985 LBR 1990 LBR -1993 LBR , 1998 LBR -2001 and SOM 1974-1977. (5) and (7), and on robust standard errors and the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8 (7)- (8) . In columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) the second and third lags of the endogenous variables are used as instruments. (5)- (6) . In columns (2), (4) and (6) the second and third lags of the endogenous variables are used as instruments.
